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DUE PROCESS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT-A POST MORTEM
Nowadays, there is no more discredited era in our judicial
history than that represented by such cases as Lochner v. New
York.' During this era, we are told, our ancestors were so
benighted economically as to embrace economic principles incapable of producing the good life, and so benighted judicially
as to read their economics into the Constitution. We have
barely left behind us the bulk of the advocates and judges
whose role in history it was to slay the giant laissez-faire, so it is
not surprising that we should have no picture of their adversary
but the dne that was drawn in the heat of battle. It is perhaps
time, however, to consider what it is that has fallen in the fight,
what weapons brought it down, and indeed, why it was worthy
of the fate it suffered. This article will attempt to explore the
nature and significance of the conceptual structure in which the
validity of the growing body of social legislation was put to the
test under the fourteenth amendment, from the first cases at the
end of the nineteenth century to the eve of the final triumph in
1937.
I
The first premise of the structure is the freedom of the individual. The powers of government are limited; residual power
is in the individual and government must point to a justification
1

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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for what it does. Until the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lochner v. New York, this premise is never questioned. This freedom is derived not from tradition but from
philosophy. Field, in the major dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases,2 relies on the Declaration of Independence,
Adam Smith, Blackstone, the struggle against monopolies in
England in the reign of James I, and a decree of Louis XVI of
France in 1776, abolishing the monopolies of guilds and trading
companies as violative of natural rights. Forty years later, Lamar,
dissenting in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 3 points to the
mounting sense of injustice that led the Parliament of the mother
country to abandon the odious restraints so happily abrogated by
our own fundamental law. Freedom of the individual, then, is
still revolutionary in the nineteenth century and emerges as an
emotional as well as a philosophical commitment. It is something
recently won and for which we have paid a high price. So Brewer,
dissenting in Budd v. New York: 4 "The paternal theory of
government is to me odious." Witness also the bitterness of
Peckham in Lochner itself.5
Thus it is not from tradition alone that the constitutional
protection accorded liberty and property derives its meaning.
Meaning is given it from the battlefield, where the mercantilism
of the eighteenth century, and the whole structure of the medieval and post-medieval state are overthrown. Liberty and property are the great contribution of the nineteenth century to
western civilization. Whether they are privileges and immunities
of citizens, as the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases insisted,6 or are that of which no man can be deprived without due7
process of law, as all the judges admitted in Munn v. Illinois,
what they are is well understood, together with the kind of state
they presuppose. A man's freedom of action is circumscribed by
only two things - the confines of his property, and the necessity
of his neighbor for a like freedom.3
2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873).
3 233 U.S. 389, 418 (1914). See also Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. at 111.
4 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892).
5 "Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown
and intelligent men may labor to earn their living are mere meddlesome interferences
with the rights of the individual." 198 U.S. at 61.
6 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83; id. at 111; id. at 124.
7 94 U.S. 113 (1877); id. at 136 (Field, dissenting).
8 Id. at 124; id. at 145.
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Corresponding roughly to these two circumscriptions are the
two powers of government that figure chiefly in this structurethe "public interest" power, quasi-proprietary in nature, which
the sovereign can exert over certain things, 9 and the "police
power" whereby the sovereign can provide for the vindication of
one man's liberty and property against those of his neighbor. 10
Governmental action that can be referred to either of these two
powers constitutes "due process of law."
The public interest power is established in Munn v. Illinois,"
where the court discerns such an interest in the grain elevators
in Chicago, which "stand in the very gateway of commerce, and
take toll from all who pass.' 2 Field, dissenting, 3 insists that
there is no public interest except in property acquired or used
under some special privilege accorded by the sovereign, but the
majority finds it where the situation smacks of monopoly; in
Brass v. North Dakota,1 4 even this requirement will be abandoned. The growth of the public interest power will be resisted
strenuously but in the end no line can be drawn to check it. 5
In the field of social legislation, however, the public interest
power will play only a peripheral part. The dominant concept
will be that of the police power, a core function of government,
to which Field-in economic and social matters the leader of the
laissez-fairewing - gives vigorous recognition elsewhere. Under
this power, government can forbid laundries to operate at night
when they might set a sleeping city afire, '1 require railroads to
fence their tracks lest livestock be struck by a train, 7 regulate the
educational level required of those who practice medicine,' 8
protect the citizen from the deceitful potentialities of oleomarMunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition). Hereafter,
the power of government to vindicate an interest of this sort will be referred to as
the "police power" whether or not the term is used in the material under discussion.
11 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
12 Id. at 132
13 Id. at 136.
14 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
15 See pp. 22-23 infra.
16 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing v.Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885).
17 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v.
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
18 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
9

10
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garine 9 and his family from the demoralizing potentialities of
drink.2 0 Further, it can advance the general prosperity by providing for the draining of a swamp, 21 and even, on the payment
of suitable compensation, for the flooding of one man's land by
another man's dam.2 2 The history of the expansion of the constitutional scope for social legislation is the history of the expansion of the police power.
II
Up to the time of Lochner, all the social legislation brought
before the court was sustained, on a miscellany of grounds.
The abolition of the fellow servant rule for liability of railroads to their employees was upheld partly as a reasonable
application of common law analogies, partly as a reasonable
regulation by the state of its corporate creature. 23 Of three cases
upholding legislation as to manner of payment of wages, one,
involving a statute forbidding railroads to discount for early
payment to discharged employees, 2 ' went off on the power of a
state to regulate its own corporate creature, while another, involving a statute forbidding advance payment of seamen's
wages,2 5 went off partly on the traditional condition of tutelage
under which the employment relations of seamen stood, partly
on the helplessness that made that condition reasonable.
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,2 6 the third wage case, upheld
the right of a state to require a company paying wages in scrip
to redeem the scrip in cash even though it purported to be rePowell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition); Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86 (1890) (regulation). In both these cases, the court found it necessary to
address the point that drinking, being injurious to no one but the drinker himself,
could not be regulated by society. Each time the point was finessed by an allusion
to those other than the drinker who are hurt.
21 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Com'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
22 Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
23 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888). It should be noted that
the power of the state to regulate the corporation is a function of the public interest
power, the corporate franchise being a privilege bestowed by the state justifying the
exertion of this power. Still, the reasonableness of the exercise of the power is determined by the court.
The common-law analogies drawn are to cases imposing absolute liability for
loss of freight. Cf. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Zernecke, 183 U.S. 582 (1902) (upholding statute imposing absolute liability for injury to passengers); St. Louis &
S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897) (upholding statute imposing absolute liability to adjoining landowners for fire).
24 St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404 (1899).
25 Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169 (1903).
26 183 U.S. 13 (1901).
19

20

1937]

SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE SUPREME COURT

deemable only in kind. This holding was rested squarely on the
police power-to prevent the employee being overreached, and
to foster good relations between employer and employee. Somewhat similar considerations were spelled out at greater length in
support of the decision in Holden v. Hardy27 permitting the state
to limit to eight the number of hours a miner works underground
in a day.
In these last two cases, it will be observed, the police power has
already made a bid to impose new limits on the philosophical
libertarianism described above. The Knoxville Iron case and
Holden v. Hardy, particularly the latter, can stand only if one
admits one or the other of the following two propositions:
1. Necessitous circumstances can vitiate the freedom properly present in the making of a contract.
2. The public has an interest in the welfare of a citizen that
can be protected even against that citizen himself.
As a matter of fact, the Court seems to have embraced both.
Peckham and Brewer, perhaps more farsighted than the others,
dissented in both cases, albeit without opinion.
Neither of these two propositions is compatible with the
strict view of liberty and property as absolutes, limited only
by similar rights of liberty and property in another person. The
first one is inconsistent with regarding property as such an
absolute: as Pitney later pointed out, speaking for the majority
in Coppage v. Kansas,2 8 inequality of bargaining position inheres
in inequality of resources; thus, to deprive a man of the advantage
of a superior bargaining position as such is to deprive him of
property as such. The second of the above propositions is inconsistent with regarding liberty as an absolute, since a man who
quietly destroys himself is in no way interfering with the liberty
of another.
The first proposition, expressed in terms of inequality of
bargaining position, as an independent argument for state power,
never succeeded in surmounting the logic of Pitney's objection.
29
Its further use is always ancillary to some other principle.
Thus, it is through the adoption of the second proposition
169 U.S. 366 (1898).
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
See Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911). This may well have
been its use in Holden v. Hardy itself - as ancillary to the right of the state to protect the health of the worker. Its appearance in the Knoxville Iron case may, although not without some difficulty, be characterized as ancillary to the vindication of
the original wage contract expressed in dollars and cents. This strikes one as some27
28
29
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that Holden v. Hardy makes a permanent contribution toward
restoring us to membership in one another: the state may now
under appropriate circumstances protect the worker against himself.

30

The scope of the protection thus made possible is qualified
severely by Lochner. The statute involved in that case, it may be
recalled, forbade the employment of bakers for more than a ten
hour day or a sixty hour week. Peckham, speaking for a majority,
denied that the act was a legitimate exercise of the police power.
Bakers, he found, are under no greater disability to fend for
themselves than anyone else. Nor is their work especially unhealthy, except to the extent that a life of labor is necessarily less
healthy than a life of ease. Thus, the statute seemed calculated
not to vindicate a legitimate police interest of the state, but to
meddle in the forbidden area of private contracts as such. The
impressive data brought forth in Harlan's dissent as to the woes
peculiar to bakers as a class was evidently not regarded by the
majority as sufficient to bring the case within the scope of Holden
v. Hardy.3 1 Indeed, the argument of the majority is lent some
force by a shrewd observation that behavior with equal danger
to health outside the employment context would not be regarded
as subject to the police power of the state.
There were two dissenting opinions. Harlan's, joined in by
two others,32 did not question the traditional freedom-policepower analysis, but found persuasive facts to indicate that
thing of a bootstrap argument. The practice involved in Knoxville Iron is not open
to the objection that it paves the way for fraudulent practices in the computation of
the wage in fact due. Cf. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
30 Such a holding is perhaps foreshadowed by a dictum in Soon Hing v. Crowley,
113 U.S. 703 (1885), in which the "physical and moral debasement which comes
from uninterrupted labor" is pointed to as justifying the Sunday laws.
31 Lochner is often regarded as a landmark example of judicial insistence on the
use of "common sense" in opposition to the data submitted by the experts. See
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). For reasons that will be gone
into at greater length below, see pp. 27-28 infra., this analysis seems unsatisfactory.
The use of sociological data in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) seems better
explained by saying that the data there submitted corresponded favorably with the
ideological presuppositions of the judges than by saying that the majority underwent
a change of conviction as to the validity of such data. Thus, the issue between the
majority and Harlan in Lochner would seem to be not whether the lot of the baker
was as wretched as it was made out to be, but whether it was wretched enough to
justify the intervention of the state-not a sociological question, but an ideological
one. As will be seen from the discussion below, the extent to which interference
with interests adhered to ideologically can be justified on sociological grounds becomes a serious question.
82 198 U.S. at 65.
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baking should be regarded as a special situation, as mining was
in Holden v. Hardy. It at least hinted that the same considerations might justify regulation of all hours of work, there being
considerable debate as to how many hours of work were consis33
tent with the health of the worker. Holmes, in a short dissent,
set forth an entirely different view. The Constitution, he insisted,
leaves the legislature free to adopt any economic views that may
commend themselves; indeed, the Constitution cannot serve to
check any sufficiently strong and sustained current of public
opinion that does not run afoul of some "traditional" libertywhich it does not here.
The Holmes dissent appears to be more a declaration of faith
than an answer to the arguments used by the other justices. These
arguments are based on the individualistic and revolutionary
ideological structure set forth above. Since this structure is individualistic, its adherents cannot accept the determinative force
Holmes accords public opinion. Since it is revolutionary, its adherents cannot content themselves, as Holmes does, with "traditional" liberties. Holmes, therefore, gives no more than an a
priori denial of an a priori position, and his views have no support
beyond such intrinsic appeal as they may have for a likeminded
reader. It is Harlan's dissent, which does not challenge the basic
ideological position of the majority, that will shape the future
arguments in social legislation cases.
For a dozen years after Lochner, the scope of permissible
social legislation is expanded, but the cases involve little in the
way of new principle. Further regulation of the manner of payment of wages and the like is sustained.3 4 The Federal Employers'
Liability Act is upheld as productive of a better and safer commerce.3 5 A meticulous compilation of sociological data, together
with an innate sense of chivalry, leads the court to permit for
women the regulation of hours Lochner forbade for men. 36 But
33

Id. at 74.

34 McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909) (miners to be paid before coal
is screened); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911) (regulating assignments of wages); Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914) wages to be paid in
cash twice monthly).
35 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
36 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This theme was elaborated upon in
Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915). Further restrictions in the interest of
efficient administration were upheld in Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
Other more or less significant cases during the period under discussion are Sturges
& Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913), allowing a state to forbid the
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state and federal laws prohibiting employer discrimination
against union members are invalidated.3 7 Coppage v. Kansas,
dealing with state law, is the high water mark of the laissez-faire
doctrines, coming just before what turns out to be a new departure in the direction of making the employer his brother's keeper.
In holding that the state cannot forbid the yellow-dog contract,
Pitney, speaking for the majority in Coppage, restates the whole
individualistic philosophy, and the interests it does and does not
recognize. It will not be held, he says, that the state has an
interest in fostering labor unions, since there is no reasonable
relationship between unions and the health, safety, morals, or
welfare that have been traditional police concerns of the state.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that no legitimate interest
of the employer is served by the yellow-dog contract, since the
contracting party is presumed to be the best judge of his own
interest. This leaves only the argument that the contract is
signed by the employee through "coercion." But coercion is an
unlawful influence and this influence is lawful. To be sure, the
worker may need the job more than the employer needs to hire
him, but this situation inheres in the difference between their
respective estates, which in turn inheres in our constitutionally
protected economic system. If we are to protect a person against
the weakness of his bargaining position as such, our object is to
level the differences of estate that the Constitution protects when
it protects property.
There are two dissenting opinions. Day's 38 is on fairly narrow
grounds, and generally unsatisfactory. Holmes' 39 is, like his
others, short, clear and forceful, but again does not seem to
address itself to the prevailing opinion. Holmes refers to the
employment of minors under sixteen in hazardous occupations, and to make good
its prohibition by making the employer strictly liable for injuries even though the
minor misrepresented his age; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911),
to the effect that a state can forbid a contract disruptive of the policy of its employers' liability laws; and Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913), upholding a safety
regulation for coal mines because the Court is unable to say that it will not promote
safety. Compare Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914) (statute requiring man to be
brakeman for two years before becoming conductor has no reasonable relation to
fitness, and is therefore arbitrary). The difference in proof requirements in these two
cases is probably responsive to the existence in Smith of the possibility of a legislative purpose antithetical to a judicially protected interest. See p. 28 infra.
37 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915).
8 236 U.S. at 27.
39

Id. at 26.
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"equality of bargaining position at which freedom of contract
begins," but the majority opinion has demolished his argument
on premises that he does not trouble himself to deny. The real
weak point in Pitney's argument-his assertion that there is no
legitimate interest of the state in fostering labor unions-goes all
but unchallenged except insofar as it is subsumed by both dissenting opinions under the question of equality of bargaining
position or that of coercion.
Coppage presented the last statement of the unadulterated
individualist position. Less than two years later in the October,
1916, term sweeping changes were produced in doctrine, which
furnished new ammunition to the supporters of social legislation,
and set a new tone to the arguments against it. Parodoxically,
the author of the most important opinions in this new turn of
affairs was Pitney himself. The occasion was the sustaining of
the three varieties of workmen's compensation legislation.4 0 In
two of the cases, the decision was unanimous; in the other, the requirement of insurance in a state fund provoked four dissents
without opinion.
The objection to workmen's compensation legislation has
probably been best stated by the New York Court of Appeals in
in the Ives4 1 case. That case has sometimes been reduced to an
a priori statement that there can be no liability without fault, but
actually it goes much deeper. Such a statement is itself a shorthand reference to principles more fundamental. To the Ives
court, workmen's compensation is Robin Hood legislation-it
takes from the rich to give to the poor with no justification except
the discrepancy in financial standing itself. Fault is a relationship;
it casts the one at fault into a nexus with his victim, to which
nexus the law can attach consequences. But the Constitution will
not admit of making a man responsible for a stranger as long
as it undertakes to protect property. The unspoken assumption
behind this argument, of course, is that employer and employee
are strangers. Presumably, this rests on the further assumption
that there is nothing between them but a contract, and that a
contract will create no relation between them that is not contracted for.
40 New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (compulsory, privately
insured); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (elective); Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (compulsory, monopolistic state fund insurance).
41 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
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The Supreme Court's opinion sustaining the law4" goes straight
to the root of the view taken in Ives. Worker and employer, says
Pitney, are engaged in a common enterprise to which the worker
contributes his bodily integrity as the employer contributes his
capital. The nature of industrial life is such that it can be predicted that a certain percentage of those at work will be killed
or injured each year. This is a risk of the business, and should be
borne by the business-that is, by the person whose role in the
business is to make the profits and bear the risks: the employer.
This holding would seem to represent a considerable departure
from what has gone before, although at the time it cannot have
been so regarded. Today, there would seem to be no way to read
it except as recognizing a status relationship between employer
and employee, out of which all manner of social responsibilities
can arise independently of the employment contract. It is
scarcely conceivable, though, that McReynolds would have let
it by on so broad a basis. At any rate, the basis was spelled out
in three cases expanding the constitutional
permission for such
4
legislation. McReynolds dissented in all. 3
The opinions of the various justices in these three cases shed
some light on the reasons which impelled them in the original
case. Holmes, for instance, sets forth his views in the Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases,4" where state legislation is sustained
providing for liability without fault to the full extent of damages
fixed by a jury. Pitney leads off by stating that the same reasons
that led to the upholding of workmen's compensation in the
usual form are applicable here. Holmes4 5 disagrees; he does not
feel that the joint enterprise found by Pitney matters. What
persuades Holmes is that liability without fault is an old story in
our legal system, and has been created sometimes in the interests
of making people extra careful, sometimes for other purposes.
42

New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919); New York Central
R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
Another case, in which no one dissented, rejected the theory that the purpose of
workmen's compensation was to prevent the injured worker or his dependents from
becoming public charges. On the contrary, said the court, the purpose is to protect
safety and give security. Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 262
U.S. 499 (1923) (compensation can be awarded to alien dependents living abroad
even though they would not become public charges if uncompensated).
44 250 U.S. 400 (1919)
45 Id. at 431 (concurring opinion).
43
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There are two dissenting opinions, 4 6 addressed generally to the
idea that such liability departs too far from the contractual view
of the employment relation, because it deprives the employer
of his quid pro quo for giving up his common law defenses, or
because it is too one-sided. It is also suggested that commonlaw damages are punitively conceived, and cannot be justified
where no wrong has been done.
In the Bianc4 7 case, the Court allowed compensation for disfigurement, against the contention that the- original rationale
applied only to wage losses. McReynolds dissented, alone and
without opinion.
The final case in the series, Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 48 upholds
the compensation law when applied to a business where there
was no foreseeable hazard, thus evoking a concurrence by McKenna in McReynolds' dissenting opinion. The dissenters quite
correctly point out that the foreseeability of injury as a risk
inherent in the business was relied on by the Court in the
original case upholding the compensation principle. But Pitney,
for the majority, counters by showing that the premium paid by
the nonhazardous business for its insurance will be low, reflecting the lack of hazard.
What may be said of these three cases in sum would seem
to be that they continue to reflect a certain amount of police
power thinking-a worker who takes an inherent risk for a
social purpose should be compensated if the harm eventuates
-but are premised further on a value judgment quite inconsistent with the earlier view that one man's liberty and property can be circumscribed only by another's. Imposition on the
employer of liability for a compensation admittedly due an employee from someone can only be justified on the basis of a
status relationship between the two. Absent that, in this context,
the police power has nothing on which to operate.
Wilson v. New 49 evoked more disagreement in the same term
(October, 1916). This case affirmed Congressional power to
make a temporary adjustment of railroad wages pending wage
negotiations, and pending a consideration of the controversy by
a commission set up for the purpose. The federal commerce
Id. at 434, 440.
47 New York Central LR. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919).
48 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
49 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
46
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power, involved here, seems to have evoked about the same complex of ideas as the state public interest power would have, although in Pitney's opinion the terminology is quite different. The
issues as the various justices saw them were whether the public
interest, with which the railroading business was admittedly
affected, authorized a regulation of wages; and whether this
temporary expedient was any better or any worse than a more
permanent regulation of wages. A majority were of the opinion
that this stood in better stead than a permanent regulation. Led
by White, they held that this was a provision reasonably calculated to keep the railroads in business while a new wage contract was negotiated, and thus interfered in no way with freedom
of contract. Two justices, Day and McKenna, expressed themselves as believing that the public interest power justified wage
regulation. McKenna concurred in the result, 50 while Day dissented on the ground that Congress must inform itself before
acting, and had acted here pending the assembling of information. 5
Pitney, in the most significant dissenting opinion, 52 used a terminology of commerce power, instead of one of public interest,
and held that such power does not justify regulation of wages
since the interest in such regulation is not commercial but
humanitarian. The public interest goes no further than the maintenance of the services involved; and the fact that the workers
will disrupt those services if not placated with higher wages does
not make the interest other than the forbidden humanitarian one.
Higher wages will not of themselves produce better work, any
more than a legislated increase in the price of locomotives will of
itself produce better equipment. Meanwhile, the regulation here
involved fares no better than wage regulation generally, for the
reasons given by Day, and because freedom of contract postulates
freedom not to enter into relations until an agreement has been
reached. Pitney's view of the commerce power, this time expressed only by a minority, will later, in RailroadRetirement Bd.
v. Alton R.R.,5 3 be adopted by a majority. The answer, formulated in Hughes' dissent in that case, that the power to regulate
50
51
52.

Id. at 360.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 373.

53 295 U.S. 330 (1935). The same considerations seem to be present in Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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commerce includes the power to see that those engaged in it act
with due regard for their social responsibilities, will pose the chief
issue in the New Deal cases, and will, of course, eventually prevail.
This same term also saw what appeared to be the demise of
Lochner. In Bunting v. Oregon,5 4 a divided Court sustained a
state law limiting the working day for men in the major industries
of the state to ten hours. The significant issue in the case seems
to have been whether the provision for overtime pay turned the
law from an hours regulation, calculated to insure the health of
the worker, into a forbidden wage regulation. Having decided
that it did not,5 5 the Court used only a paragraph in deciding
that hours regulation was not invalid as such. It first pointed out
that the appellant had introduced no facts to prove his assertion
that the statute had no reasonable relation to health. Then it
referred to a general statement by the state court that the ten
hour day was customary in Oregon and quoted other statistics as
to the customary work day from the opinion of the state court
(which had taken them from Harlan's dissent in Lochner) .56
Nowhere in the whole opinion is Lochner mentioned. Three
dissenters did not hand down an opinion, and Brandeis, who
might have given a more enlightening opinion on the majority
power of the state
side, did not sit. In this way, the general
57
to regulate hours of labor was upheld.
This case must remain as something of a question mark,
first, because it ignored Lochner, and second, because it placed
the burden of producing data as to the social effect of the legislation under attack on the attacker, instead of the proponent of
the legislation, who had always had it before. That some change
in the sociological thinking of the court had taken place seems
a necessary conclusion. That the justices were unwilling expressly
to overrule Lochner would seem to indicate that the ideological
presuppositions of that case still commanded some support
54 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
55 See note 90 inira.
56 State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259, 139 Pac. 731, at 735-36 (1914). Quoted in
243 U.S. at 438-39.
57 Hours regulation in specific occupations where some public interest in the
alertness of the employee supported the exercise of the police power had already
been upheld. See, e.g., Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (railroads),
as had general hours regulation for women. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(need for healthy mothers justified use of police power).
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among those who constituted the majority. A possible explanation of Bunting would be that it was responsive to a general
conviction that the worker who worked more than ten hours a
day in 1917 was in a social context that left him below the
standard of bodily and mental health to which our civilization
had attained. Since this would be a "common-sense" conviction,
the judges would presumably rely on it unless sociological data
were advanced to persuade them otherwise. At the same time,
they would not have to say that the situation was similar with
respect to bakers in 1905-thus Lochner would retain a certain
validity.
At any rate, by the time of Bunting v. Oregon it must have
been fairly clear that utilitarian considerations were generally
running counter to the traditional constitutionally protected liberties in the economic sphere. The extent to which this was true
was perhaps not as apparent to those ideologically committed to
the maintenance of such liberties as it was to others,58 but it was
a factor to be reckoned with for everyone. What in Lochner was
debatable even in the presence of sociological data was evidently
undeniable in Bunting, on the basis of common knowledge alone.
The time had come, then, for the advocates of economic liberty
to reconsider to what extent the principles they espoused were
to be maintained on ideological grounds, regardless of social
effect. Adams v. Tanner,59 also in the October, 1916 term,
establishes the form this reconsideration will take.
The legislation involved in Adams v. Tanner, abolishing the
private employment agency financed by fees collected from the
worker, is supported by what is perhaps the prototypical Brandeis
opinion. 60 Brandeis introduces masses of citations from investigative commissions and other groups to show the evils of the
abolished agencies, as experienced both nationally and locally.
From other such data, he shows that these evils cannot practically be eliminated without eliminating the agencies that produce them. He shows further that unemployment is an economic problem of general concern requiring a coordinated
58

Sutherland, for instance, some years after the cases under discussion, intro-

duces some egregious social and economic assumptions in support of his conclusions
in, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), without, however, affecting the fundamentally
ideological grounding of his holdings.

59
60

244 U.S. 590 (1917).
Id. at 597.
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response. However, for a majority of the court, speaking through
McReynolds, none of these considerations can avail to sustain
the act. The business of finding jobs for those who need them is
obviously not a noxious trade, but a useful one. The abuses that
have been pointed out justify any regulation calculated to
eliminate them, 6 1 but not the entire abolition of a useful trade.
Indeed, McReynolds continues, the real motive for the abolition
is probably not the abuses, but the philosophical consideration
that the worker has a right to a job, and that it is therefore wrong

to maintain a system whereby it costs him money to find one.
This consideration was advanced in support of the act, but of
course is unavailing.
This is as far as McReynolds goes in spelling out his views. He
makes'no real attempt to distinguish the various cases that have
regarded the potentiality of abuse as sufficient reason for abolish63
62
ing such businesses as pool halls, margarine manufacture,
and trade in grain futures. 64 Two possible interpretations suggest
themselves. One is that the philosophical consideration advanced
by the state showed that the legislature was motivated not by the
abuses referred to, but by the forbidden purpose of imposing
on contractual relations an objectionable system of values. 65
The other possibility is that some distinction on the basis of the
nature of the businesses abolished or other circumstances has
been seized upon to weaken the authority of the old cases, so
that, as a general rule, it will no longer be open to legislatures
61 There seems to be no doubt that McReynolds would have sustained substantial
regulation seriously interfering with the conduct of the business. In general, regulation
of employment agencies, including the requirement of a license, had already been
upheld. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).
62 Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912)
(conducive to idleness and
immorality).
63 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (can be mistaken for butter).
64 Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902) (possibility of gambling use).
65 It should be noted that the philosophical consideration here referred to does
not purport to be a principle of commutative justice ("it is unjust that a given
worker should have to pay for the services rendered him by a given employment
agency"), but a principle of social justice ("it is unjust that the institutions of our
society should be such that a worker cannot find a job without paying for the
services of an employment agency"). The distinction may be useful in interpreting
some later cases, particularly Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934), and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in both of which the
requirements of the economy at large, rather than those of any individual, were
relied on to sustain the legislation under attack. It would seem, however, that
even in these cases, no distinction of this sort was germane to the cleavages in the
court. Accordingly, in the discussion of the principles involved in the cases under
consideration, no attempt to classify according to such a distinction will be made.
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to protect the public health, safety, morals or welfare by abolishing a trade.
The first viewpoint is probably implicit in Lochner; the second
would be new. They are perhaps interdependent in that whether
the abuses to which a business is open would lead the legislature
to abolish it must necessarily depend both on the abuses and on
the social utility of the business minus the abuses. McReynolds
can hardly mean that a state is no longer free to abolish pool
halls or saloons. At any rate, it would seem that with Adams v.
Tanner, the Court has gone beyond the old rule that circumstances justifying the exercise of the police power create a
general exception to the general rule of freedom, and has begun
to embroider upon it another rule that certain types of interference with freedom, of which prohibition of some businesses
is an example, are exceptions to the exception, and cannot be
justified even where circumstances call for an exercise of police
power.
This October, 1916 term, then, sets up divergent principles
that will appear in various juxtapositions in the thinking of the
justices from here until the final green light for most social
legislation is given two decades later. It might be well to recapitulate these principles and see where they are to lead.
1. There exists a social responsibility arising out of the employment relation, which the state may vindicate. This is the
teaching of the workmen's compensation cases, and their sequels
already discussed. On several occasions, however, it will still be
stoutly denied.
2. Temporary legislation addressed to an emergency that can
be shown to exist may stand in better stead than permanent
legislation. This seems to be an important basis for Wilson v.
New. It will be articulated as the justification for the mortgage
67
moratorium in the Blaisdell case. 68 In the rent control cases,
it seems to appear as a special case of the public interest power.
3. Some individual rights are protected against governmental
curtailment even if there exist circumstances requiring the government to act. This principle seems basic to judicial review of
legislation. It has always been involved in the cases applying
66 Supra note 65.
67 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U.S. 170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922);
compare Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
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the distinction between the police power and the eminent domain
power-the latter going more to the essence of the property
right than the former. 8 In Adams v. Tanner it appears to be
given a new scope in the field of constitutional limitations on the
police power. It will figure in the dissenting opinions in the
Blaisdell case, 9 and the rent control cases, 70 and in the majority
opinion in the cases invalidating regulation of wages and prices.
4. The federal commerce power is not as broad as the police
power of the states. This is at least hinted at in the earlier Adair7"
case. It is made explicit in Pitney's dissent in Wilson v. New, and
is implicit in the prevailing opinion in the same case. The invalidation of federal legislation in Hammer v. Dagenhart,72 and
in Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. 7s will hinge on this
principle. The ultimate sustaining of federal legislation in the
field of employment relations will depend on an answer to it.
Hughes' insistence7 4 that the power to regulate commerce must
include the power to hold to their social responsibilities those
who engage in it will not command a majority in the Railroad
Retirement Board case. But the further refinement that a dispute
disruptive of commerce must be resolved justly rather than unjustly will sustain federal power
to establish collective bargaining
75
in the area of commerce.
That a certain disequilibrium has been introduced by the
recognition of these principles seems evident in retrospect. Both
the conservative and the liberal positions have been restated in
terms which, if not inconsistent, are at least incommensurable.
The task facing the conservatives at this point is that of stating
68 This seems to be the teaching both of Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and of Brandeis in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
69 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (per Suther-

land).

70 E.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (per McKenna).
71 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
72 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
73 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
74 Id. at 374.
75 Texas & N.O.R.Rk. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This standard,
it should be noted, might not change the result in Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra note
72, since, as pointed out there, the objectionable practices were not connected with
the regulated commerce itself. This objection was met by adding to the principle
referred to in text a principle that forbids the use of interstate commerce to achieve
socially undesirable results in the several states. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941). This process, it will be noted, gradually assimilates the federal commerce
power to the state police power.
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their newly formulated principles in operationally significant
terms consistent with the workmen's compensation cases, with
Bunting, and with Wilson v. New. In this they will never quite
succeed.
Meanwhile, redefining the scope of constitutionally protected
individualism called not only for setting new limits on the police
power - the process begun in Adams v. Tanner - but also for
setting limits on the expanding public interest power. Here too,
the need for operationally significant criteria was recognized, 76
but not quite met. The cases attempting to accomplish the task
were first the Wolff Packing Co. 77 case, invalidating the ill-fated
Kansas compulsory arbitration law; and, second, Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton.78 The categories of business affected with a public
interest were reduced to three: (1) those that historically operated under royal prerogative or were traditionally regulated,
(2) those that presently operate under some kind of public franchise, and (3) those that are in some way monopolistic. The
first two were recognized by Field dissenting in Munn v. Illinois;
the third was recognized by the Munn majority.
It was this third category that proved troublesome. The cases
had moved "monopoly" far beyond its traditional meaning.7" As
it stood, it eluded definition. Stone, dissenting in the Tyson case,
offered an interpretation of it as covering those businesses that
could not be effectively regulated by the traditional forces of
competition.8 0 This was perhaps operationally significant, but
evidently too broad to commend itself to the then majority. The
result was that the conservatives were unable to set any effective
limit to the kinds of business that were affected with a public in76 Compare the two cases about to be discussed with the dissent in German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), where the problem of operational
significance does not seem to be recognized.
77 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
78 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
79 Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894) held that the business of grain
elevators was affected with a public interest on what seems to have been this ground,
even though it was shown that there was 600 grain elevators along the particular
railroad track involved, and that anyone wishing to build another could do so for
$500. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) held the insurance
business to be affected with a public interest for a complex of reasons, of which
concert in rate making was only a minor one.
80 273 U.S. at 447. Cf. A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267
U.S. 233 (1925), holding that a civil remedy cannot constitutionally be given one
charged an "unreasonable" price for sugar, since the conditions of the sugar market
make it impossible to tell what is a reasonable price.
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terest. 8 1 Thus, a few years after Tyson in Nebbia v. New York,82
a majority held that the term "affected with a public interest"
meant no more than that there were reasonable grounds for regulating the business involved-in other words, that any business
could be regulated. Roberts, speaking for the Court in Nebbia,
was able to make an overwhelming demonstration from the cases
that no narrower limit could be supported. At least after Brass
v. North Dakota,83 and probably after Munn itself, Nebbia was
inevitable.
The public interest power, however, had been subjected to
another limitation which minimized its effectiveness as a support
for social legislation. The Wolff case had held that the public
interest was divisible, so that there might be a public interest in
regulating some aspects of a business, and still not be a public
interest in regulating wages. This ties in with the limitations on
the commerce power assumed by the majority and articulated by
the dissent in Wilson v. New. There would be at least some
tendency to confine the public interest to the external affairs of
a business, as distinguished from its internal ordering.84
Meanwhile, it was held that the police power, even when it
extended to fixing the other terms of a contract, did not extend
to fixing prices - in the case of the employment contract, wages.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital"5 held that wages could not be
regulated, and Ribnik v. McBride86 indicated that price regulation could not be supported by circumstances justifying a general
exercise of the police power, but would have to stand or fall under the public interest power as. limited in Tyson. The argument,
expressed in Adkins, for protecting the price term more carefully
than other terms of a contract seems to have been that it can
compensate for the limitations on the other terms. This is fairly
81
When the opponents of regulation came to the point of adopting the criterion
suggested by Stone in Tyson, it was too late. Olson v. Nebraska ex rel. Western
Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (state need not justify price regulation by
a showing that competition does not effectively regulate the business involved).
82 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
83 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
84 That the public interest power did not undergo the same change of content
described above for the federal commerce power is probably due to the previous
recognition of the police power as a power of the states. Assimilating the public
interest power to the police power, as was done with the commerce power, was
unnecessary. It seems likely, however, that the current abandonment of the distinction between the two powers of the state is responsive to a growing conviction that
they are for the most part coextensive.
85 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
86 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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obvious when it comes to fixing standard weights for a loaf of
bread,87 but seems an oversimplification when it comes to wages.
Except with respect to wages, of course, Nebbia made the question of the relation between the police power and price-fixing
irrelevant.8
The basic issue on which the question of wage-fixing was decided in Adkins was independent of the dubious social and
economic doctrine Sutherland expounds in the opinion. The
essence of Sutherland's argument seems to be the following:
once it is decided that the state may protect the worker against
himself, and that long hours are unhealthy for him, it naturally
follows that the state may limit the number of hours of work
he may contract to perform. This is in no way burdensome to the
employer, because he need pay no more for the truncated work
day than it is "worth" to him - no more than it will bring on the
open market. 89 If the employer Is incidentally vexed by not having the services of a favorite employee as long as he would like,
he has no right to complain, because his rights are subordinate
to the interest of the state in protecting the health of the employee.9 0 But when the state begins regulating wages, it imposes
a direct burden on the employer. Even if the state can and should
see that the worker receives an amount set by public authority as
enough to live on,91 there is no reason why the employer should
Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913).
88 Since the public interest power had always been recognized as extending to
price-fixing, the recognition in Nebbia of an across-the-board public interest power
carried with it an across-the-board price-fijng power. On this basis, Ribnik was
overruled on its own facts in Olsen v. Nebraska, supra note 81.
89 Whether the Adkins court would have decided that some standard of worth
extraneous to the contract could be brought in to determine worth is something
we will never know. Compare A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267
U.S. 233 (1925) with Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) considered a statute
that purportedly regulated wages on the basis of worth, but the majority of the
court did not read the statute as embodying a worth test.
90 It will be noted that the main center of controversy in Bunting was whether
the provision for extra pay for overtime constituted a wage regulation-the
argument against the statute being, of course, that a given number of hours of
labor was not rendered less deleterious to the health by being paid for at an increased rate. The answer of the court that the overtime pay provisions are intended
as a penalty seems far-fetched, but is perhaps not an inaccurate statement if one
thinks of the provision for extra pay as calculated to discourage overtime as an
institution, rather than to penalize it in the individual instance. See Overnight
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-8 (1942). The distinction between
commutative and social justice, as drawn in note 65, supra, seems relevant here.
91 To be sure, Sutherland would have it that the determination of how much
the worker needs to live on is a highly personal matter best discovered from the
judgment of the worker himself as embodied in the wage contract to which he has
87
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be obligated to furnish that amount unless the services performed
by the employee are "worth" that much. 2
This argument seems almost identical with that advanced
against workmen's compensation legislation - minimum wage
laws are another example of Robin Hood legislation. Since it
still seems to be the law that the state cannot constitutionally
make one person contribute to another without some reason
other than the greater affluence of the contributor, the argument
of the Adkins opinion, like that against workmen's compensation,
can only be answered by a moral judgment as to the social responsibilities arising out of the employment relation. That a person who devotes his productive activity to a business is entitled
to be supported, together with his dependents, by that business is
a moral principle and the prevailing opinion in West Coast Hotel
9 3 in which Adkins was overruled, is predicated
Co. v. Parrish,
on
it. Adkins says that to make the employer pay wages based on
need is to put on him a burden rightly that of the state. Parrish
says that to place underpaid workers on the relief rolls is to make
the community
provide "a subsidy for unconscionable em'9 4
ployers.

A similar moral judgment was the basis for the establishment
of governmental power to foster the collective bargaining relaagreed. This argument, however, is not heavily relied on by Sutherland. It seems to
be premised on the theory that the state cannot protect the individual against himself,
which, as we have seen, was rejected in Holden v. Hardy. In the particular case,
Sutherland's conviction of the impracticality of setting a minimum wage was reinforced by the action of the administrator, who found that the wage necessary to preserve health, morals and decent living differed from job to job.
92 Holmes in his dissent in Adkins, 261 U.S. at 567, points out with a good
deal of logic that the employer will not retain services unless they are "worth"
to him what he is required to pay for them. But the moral issue otherwise present
in the case seems to lurk also in the point thus stated. Whether and to what extent
"worth" is a function of market is involved in the analyses of both Holmes and
Sutherland. Holmes seems to mean that the employer would rather pay the required price for the services than do without them. Sutherland would have the
answer that his willingness to pay the minimum wage for them is responsive not to
their "worth," but to the fact that the minimum wage law prevents his getting
similar services cheaper from another. Thus, the law requires the employer to pay
for all such services more than they are "worth." What this exchange would indicate
appears to be the inability of Sutherland to see a standard of "worth" independently
of a freely operating economy, and the inability of Holmes to see a standard of
'worth" independently of a freely operating legal system. These are the same ideological presuppositions that the respective justices have displayed throughout the
cases under discussion.
93 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
94 Id. at 399.
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tion in the Railway Clerks95 case. An employer who had dismissed certain employees in the course of an attempt to establish
a company union was directed under the Railway Labor Act to
reinstate them. The Court held that the power of Congress to
regulate commerce included a power to adjust, equitably, disputes that threatened to disrupt it, and that a vindication of the
right of collective bargaining by freely chosen representatives
was an equitable adjustment of a dispute, or potential dispute,
on this subject. Adair and Coppage were distinguished on the
ground that the statutes invalidated in those cases went directly
to the hiring and firing of workers - matters enjoying special
protection, presumably, under the principles already announced
whereas those activities were reached here only by way of
affording relief from the non-protected practice of establishing
a company union.
After this case, the Raihoad Retirement Board96 case comes as
something of a surprise, with its holding that the commerce power
is not adequate to provide a pension plan for railroad workers.
It is possible that the employment of superannuated personnel did
not threaten to disrupt commerce as strikes did, and on that basis
a distinction might be made. But the court added that even if
superannuation did seriously impair the efficiency of the service,
the federal power would be exhausted by a requirement that the
superannuated worker cease to work, without a provision for
pensioning him off. This seems unjustified in view of the unanimous decision in the Railway Clerks case that the power to
eliminate an obstacle to commerce is the power to eliminate it
justly. At any rate, in the subsequent Wagner Act cases9 7 the
95 Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930).
96 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
97 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
142 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). The position of the
conservative justices as to the principle set forth in text is somewhat difficult to
fathom. Of the Wagner Act cases, they dissented in all but the one that involved
a common carrier in interstate commerce. But in their dissenting opinion they
relied on due process objections under Adair and Coppage as well as on strict
commerce clause objections. They distinguished the Railway Clerks case, in which
they concurred, by quoting the distinction of Adair and Coppage offered there.
Assuming that these justices maintained a consistent position in all these cases, it
would seem to be that the free choice of whom to employ, as given constitutional
protection under Adair and Coppage can be interfered with only as a sanction to
preserve the right of collective bargaining where the movement of commerce is at
stake, but not for any other reason.
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court seems to have returned to this principle, but not to have
embraced Hughes' view, enunciated in his dissent in the Retirement Board case, that the power to regulate commerce included
a power to have it conducted with due regard for social responsibilities, whether or not a disruption is threatened."'
m
Regardless of what may be said about the opinions just discussed on the conservative side, a reading of them should indicate that they are no more examples of "mechanical jurisprudence" than are any of the more recent emanations from the
court. They are opinions of earnest men coming to grips with
live issues. They are marked by an ardent conviction that we
should not fail to respect, even if we might wish it bestowed on
doctrines more worthy of it. Nor can the judges be accused of
paying too little attention to the burgeoning sciences of economics and sociology. Whenever those sciences showed conditions
that could not be discerned unaided and that were considered
relevant to the validity of the legislation under review, they were
given careful heed, and often relied on. The liberal wing of the
court never did more. Thus, the data advanced by Butler in
support of the legislation struck down in Near v. Minnesota,9
made a showing very similar to Brandeis' in Adams v. Tanner,
if less elaborate. In both cases, the majority ignored the data
thus advanced because they saw a principle that transcended
any considerations of expediency or social policy. Indeed, it
appears that nowadays we have again reached a position in which
most due process cases can be decided without the benefit of
sociological data. In economic regulation cases, no such data are
necessary to sustain the legislation; 10 0 in free speech and similar
cases no such data are availing to sustain it. In other words, far
from refusing to listen to sociological data, the conservative
judges called forth such data by embracing a scheme of juris98 A further move in the direction of this last view seems to have been taken
in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See note 75 supra. It is interesting
that McReynolds, the only one of the conservatives left on the court, did not dissent
in Darby.

99 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Olson v. Nebraska ex reL Western Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
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prudence to which sociological considerations are at least sometimes relevant. 10 1
For the conservative judges in the cases under consideration,
as for the liberal judges in the free speech cases, the problem is
one of a relation between an interest committed to the legislature
for protection and one committed to the judiciary for protection.
For judicial resolution of such a problem it seems necessary that
two questions be asked and answered if the judicial protection
is to be adequate:
1. Is the legislative interest really present here, or is the legislation in fact calculated to vindicate the antithesis of the judicially protected interest? This question was answered adversely to
the legislation in Lochner, in Coppage, and perhaps in Adams
v. Tanner as well, on the theory that the legislation involved was
not in fact motivated by the public health, safety, morals or welfare, but by a purpose to adjust between the propertied and the
propertyless in a manner opposed to the judicially protected
property interest. A similar adverse answer is given in free
speech cases where the requisite danger to public safety is not
present - the interest to be vindicated by the legislation turns
out to be an interest in silencing offensive voices, rather than an
interest in protecting the public safety.'
To answer such a
question, the impact of the interdicted conduct must be given
careful consideration on the facts, whereupon the nature of the
interest being vindicated can be considered.
2. If the legislative interest is present, is the vindication here
chosen so destructive of the judicially protected interest as to be
invalid? This question was answered adversely to the legislation
in Adkins, perhaps in Adams v. Tanner, and in Near v. Minne101 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (per Sutherland), is the prime example of the use of scientific data by the conservative justices;
cases like Advance-Rumley Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932) (per
Butler) employ the same kind of data, but seem to have gathered them not from
any source that would be characterized as scientific, but from more or less unsupported statements in the opinion of the state court. At any rate, there seems to be
no support for a view that the liberal justices made a practice of relying on
scientific data, whereas the conservatives relied on "common sense" or other nonscientific determinations. This may have been true in particular cases, such as New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), but was not true in general. New
State, it should be noted, came between Tyson and Nebbia, so that the field was in
a state of flux. The conservative justices must have been in some doubt as to the
point at which their ideological positions were to be drawn up.
102 The distinction is perhaps best brought out in Brandeis' dissent in Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
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sota, where the doctrine that constitutional rights have "essences"
was articulated. Legislation may be invalidated under this test
either if it invades the "essence" of the judicially protected interest, as in the cases just mentioned, or if it is predicated on the
view that the legislative interest can best be served by the abrogation of the judicially protected interest. Thus, the conservative
judges held that the police power did not justify doing away with
important attributes of property as an institution on the ground
that public health, safety, morals or welfare would be better
served without them; l03 thus it is held today that the state cannot
prohibit the expression of certain opinions on the ground that
the very exthey are so antipathetic to public sentiment that
104
pression of them leads to breaches of the peace.
It appears, then, that the conservative judges cannot properly
be accused of unjudicial behavior in their manner of going about
the protection of the interests they decided to protect. What must
be objected to, if anything, are the interests thus protected. Such
objection is possible either on ideological grounds, or on the
ground that the constitutional provision involved does not call
for an ideological decision.
Whether the provisions of the fourteenth amendment called
for an ideological evaluation of "liberty," "property," and "due
process of law" was carefully considered both in the SlaughterHouse Cases and in Munn v. Illinois. In the latter case, an affirmative answer was given by the full Court. The liberty of the
Negro was to be protected by placing the whole structure of freedom from ideologically improper governmental encroachment
under federal protection. Liberty and property were to include
the fullest possible enjoyment of faculties and things owned; due
process was to include only the ideologically justifiable activities
of government. Whether this structure was constitutionally leregarded by all concerned as no longer open to
gitimate was
5

question.

10

103 The most earnest statement of this view appears in Sutherland's dissent in
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Coppage may also be
an example.
104 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
105 The liberal justices invoked the same structure in the free speech cases.
Without admitting it to have been legitimate in its inception, they held that it was
so firmly embodied in the cases that it could be used in evaluating restraints on
speech. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (per Holmes, dissenting);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (per Brandeis, concurring).
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Admitting, therefore, that the intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment was to give ideological content to its
provisions, are succeeding judges at liberty to include in that
content some ideological commitment other than that of the
framers themselves? It would seem that the question as thus
stated must be given an affirmative answer. The framers of the
constitutional provisions involved seem to have envisaged liberty
not as an administrative adjustment, but as a heritage. They had
open to them the choice of painting with broad strokes or with
narrow strokes, and chose the broad. How they would have
filled in the outlines does not seem too relevant in view of their
deliberate choice of leaving it to their successors to fill them in.
The interaction between static and dynamic elements in law is
not peculiar to the constitutional field; nor is the interaction between the conscience of the judge and the emanations of the consciences of his authorities. The ability to operate with integrity
and vision in these fields of interaction makes great judges, and
the formula for greatness cannot be put down in a paragraph.
Suffice it to say that none of the justices in the cases under discussion seems to have transgressed the bounds of legitimate judicial behavior in this respect.
Holmes, although he formulates his objection to his colleagues'
decisions in terms of an unwarrantable importation of an ideological commitment into the Constitution, seems to be making his
evaluation in terms of an ideological commitment of his own. His
conviction, embodied in his long series of lonely dissents, seems
to have been that it is unavailing, and probably unwise, to attempt any ultimate check on the eventuation of something strongly enough desired by public opinion. This left him convinced
that only activities directed toward the influencing of public
opinion are entitled to judicial protection. 106 Any other constitutional protections he was willing to afford came strictly from
legal considerations - like those involved in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon-' 0 7 without ideological content.
In those views, Holmes was able to influence a number of his
successors, but none of his colleagues except possibly Brandeis. 08
106

See also Holmes' dissenting opinions in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.

616, 624 (1920); Gitlow v. New York, supra note 105.
107 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
108 See his concurrence in Whitney v. California, supra note 105. It will be noted
that Brandeis' opinions in the economic cases are entirely different from Holmes',
although one usually joins in the opinion of the other. It is perhaps significant that
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The other judges of the period seem to have seen liberty as embodying the protection to be accorded the individual on ideological grounds against the action of government, whether or not
supported by public opinion. This view seems both more in
keeping with our constitutional tradition, 10 9 and more consistent
with the institution of judicial review of legislation. 1 0 Certainly,
in any area where the ideological considerations are seen as independent of public opinion, Holmes' view of the Constitution
will not do.
Ultimately, the objection to the position of the conservative
justices must be made on ideological grounds. Holmes is right
in saying that the position rests on an ideology, but wrong in
saying that it can be rejected without passing judgment on the
ideology on which it rests. What that ideology is should be apparent from the foregoing discussion. Basically, it is a disclaimer of the right of the Court to make a moral judgment. Thus,
when Sutherland says in Adkins that if the state can set minimum
wages it can also set maximum wages, he seems to be insisting
either that no moral judgment on the quantum of wages is possible, or that none is legally cognizable. To answer him, it must
be held that the payment of high wages is, generally speaking,
better morally than the payment of low wages,'
and that this
fact has legal consequences., As has been shown, the case overruling Adkins held exactly that.
The doctrinaire individualism which actuated the Court in
the nineteenth century and influenced the conservative judges of
the twentieth, seems to stem from a philosophical commitment
to the view that no institutional supersession of the individual's
Brandeis concurred in Pitney's opinion in the Arizona Employers Liability Cases,
although Holmes did not. See p. 14 supra. That Brandeis was more concerned with
ideological considerations than was Holmes is borne out also in cases where they
disagreed with each other, the familiar Pennsylvania Coal case, and Meyers v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
109 See Th FaRnAisr, Nos. 51, 78 (Hamilton).
110 For an elucidation of this writer's views on this subject in another context,
see Religious Education and the Historical Method of Constitutional Interpretation,
9 Rtrraaas L. Rav. 682, 694-95 (1955).
111 This statement will, of course, be subject to important qualifications, as
when some ceiling on wages is necessary to control inflation. Similarly, even though a
general principle of morality calls for a business to pay a wage sufficient to maintain those who devote their productive activity to the business, it may be appropriate
for a person who is under some physical disability impairing his productive capacity
to be only partially supported by the business to which he devotes himself, the
difference being made up by some program of social insurance against disability.
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moral judgment of his own acts is permissible. Under this view,

the jural concept of liberty, with its ancillary concept of property,
is absolute; and the law's function is limited to fixing the boundary between the area in which A is free to do good or evil as he
may choose, and the area in which B is free to do the same. In
the end, the view of the nature of man and of society on which
these doctrines were based proved itself repugnant to reason and
experience alike. The sociological data that found its way both
into legal argument and into the general literature of the period
certainly contributed heavily to the disillusionment with the individualist ethic, and thus to the intellectual climate in which
older traditions of social responsibility reasserted themselves. But

ultimately these traditions rest not on sociological data but on
the brotherhood of man - and the brotherhood of man is not a
sociological doctrine.
Liberty, as our institutions know it,"' does not demand the
individualistic ethic. It postulates not that there is no legally
cognizable distinction between good and evil, but that there are
some goods that will serve their purposes only if freely given. It
has long been our experience as a people that many goods, even
112 "Liberty" or "freedom" appears in our legal institutions as a limitation on the
power of government in favor of a choice made by the individual. The forms this
limitation has taken in political and ethical theory would seem to be the following:
(1) Government cannot evaluate objectively the validity of a moral choice made
by the individual (freedom of conscience I ).
(2) Government should set a high value on allowing the individual to give
effect to his moral choice, even if that choice is objectively wrong (freedom
of conscience 2 ).
(3)
Government should not prevent the individual from doing wrong (freedom
to do wrong).
(4) Government should not prevent the individual from doing something unless
it is wrong (freedom to do right).
Freedom of conscience, would seem to be the foundation of the individualist
ethic, as discussed in text. It postulates that only the individual can say what is
best for himself. From this, it seems to follow that the highest good of the individual
may be contrary to the good of his neighbor or of society. Cf. Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious convictions of individual held no excuse for
violation of law enacted for good of society, without any attempt made by court
to consider whether those convictions are objectively true or false). This view regards society as in essence competitive, and in effect, denies the brotherhood of man.
Freedom of conscience 2 is basically what is suggested in text as the proper scope
of jural liberty. If social ties are to be built on love rather than fear, the basic
weapon of society against deviant behavior must be persuasion rather than suppression. See West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). This
desideratum must, however, be weighed in the balance with other goals of society.
The result of such a weighing in the area under discussion seems clearly to be in
favor of governmental intervention.
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some of those most necessary to society, are such. But a living
wage is not one of them. That a commitment to liberty did not,
in a society whose roots are Christian, preclude the vindication
of the two simple principles on which, as we have seen, the cases
sustaining the validity of our social legislation were rested should
be no surprise. Holden v. Hardy established in the employment
area the ancient principle that a man may not destroy himself
even if he wishes to. The workmen's compensation cases added
to this that the economic unit to which he gives his life must provide him with the means to live. These are minimal requirements
of our membership in one another and in society. The state may,
indeed should, give them effect with the means at its command.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*

Freedom to do wrong is a dubious political construct on the theological doctrine
of freedom of the will. Govermmeni, it is argued, should not attach sanctions to
the doing of evil, because it thereby diminishes the merit of one who chooses to do
good. This is theologically unsound. The same theology that teaches that God
has left the will free teaches that He has provided it with every possible extrinsic
assistance to choose good, and that human society is intended to constitute one such
assistance. See Leo XIII encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum,June 30, 1888.
Freedom to do right is responsive to what seems a proper evaluation of the worth
of the individual. Since people partake of the same nature, there are some ethical
principles that are binding on all. At the same time, since people are greately diversified, there is no one course of action that is better for everyone than all others.
Thus, the state should content itself with preventing evil, without imposing one good
to the exclusion of alternative goods. This principle may have been violated to some
extent by the mercantilism of the eighteenth century, and to the extent vindicated
by the revolutions of the nineteenth. It is no doubt a part of our constitutionally
protected liberties, but cf. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (union shop contract cannot be given constitutional
protection unless Adkins and Lochner are to be revived), but it has not been mentioned in text because it does not seem germane to the area under discussion. It does
not protect either conduct unjust in itself, or conduct productive of socially undesirable consequences.
*
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